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I. INTRODUCTION 
Compliance is a mantra in international law. For many years scholars have questioned the extent to which states 
comply with human rights monitoring institutions at the international and regional levels. In most cases these 
scholars find that human rights monitoring institutions have limited, and sometimes insignificant impact, on the 
human rights practices of states. At the UN level, Heyns and Viljoen (2002:6) conclude that UN treaty monitoring 
bodies ‘had a very limited demonstrable impact’ within states. In 2010, Alebeek and Nollkaemper (2012) found 
only about 12% compliance with the views of the Human Rights Committee which was declining over time. In 
2014, a cross-country study of Finland, The Netherlands, and New Zealand found that the concluding 
observations and recommendations of the human rights treaty bodies have limited influence on the domestic 
human rights practices of states Krommendijk 2014). At the African regional level, Viljoen and Louw found an 
overall lack of state compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (Viljoen and Louw 2007).  
At the heart of these studies is the question of state compliance with international human rights law and the 
broader question of how international human rights institutions can influence states. This article approaches these 
questions by reviewing five major theoretical approaches to state compliance to determine which can more 
appropriately explain the potential impact of state engagement with the UPR mechanism.  
Section II undertakes a general review of the existing scholarship on the UPR mechanism within two broad 
perspectives that I have identified: the ‘sceptical group’ who argue that the UPR is institutionally weak and needs 
to be overhauled or replaced by an entirely new institution; and the ‘evolutionary group’ who contend that the 
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UPR is an evolving mechanism whose effectiveness is only limited by factors such as politicisation, regionalism 
and ritualism, and can be improved within the existing cooperative framework. This section seeks to establish the 
attitude of existing literature to the question of whether the UPR, as a cooperative peer review process, can 
contribute to positively impact the domestic human rights situation of states. 
Section III then considers competing theoretical frameworks to understand the potential impact of the UPR by 
reviewing five major theoretical approaches to state compliance with international human rights law. These are 
the coercive compliance-centred theory, the ‘naming and shaming’ approach, the transnational legal process 
theory, the five-stage ‘spiral model’, and the theory of acculturation. This section argues that while these theories 
are not mutually exclusive, the theory of acculturation provides the most appropriate theoretical framework to 
understand the potential impact of the UPR mechanism. This is because unlike the other theories, the acculturation 
theory does not incorporate any element of coercion or confrontation. This mirrors the inclusive and cooperative 
framework of the UPR mechanism which I argue provides important and effective conditions for acculturation. 
By incorporating a theoretical conception of the potential impact of the UPR process, this article contributes to 
existing scholarship in this area which generally has limited theoretical engagement with the impact of the UPR 
process.  
The focus of this article is therefore confined to the UPR and does not purport to have direct implications on state 
engagement with other mechanisms in the international human rights system, even though they may overlap in 
some key functions. For example, while state reporting activities under the treaty bodies in some ways overlaps 
with state reporting under the UPR mechanism, both mechanisms significantly different. Universality is a key 
principle of the UPR can be characterised not only in terms of the universality of the process, but also the rights 
covered. This distinguishes it from the human rights treaty bodies. The scope of the work of the treaty bodies is 
limited only to states that have ratified the specific treaty within their competence and only to the rights specified 
in each particular treaty. In terms of the rights covered, the UPR examines broader obligations under the UDHR 
and applicable international humanitarian law, including commitments and voluntary pledges made by individual 
states (Human Rights Council 2006, para 1). Unlike the treaty bodies, the UPR is truly universal since all UN 
member states are reviewed, regardless of whether the state has ratified any human rights treaties and the UPR 
has in two cycles (2008-2016) achieved 100 percent state cooperation rate.1 
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II. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 60/251 establishes the Human Rights Council (HRC) as a 
subsidiary organ of the General Assembly which replaces the Commission for Human Rights (UNGAR – Human 
Rights Council 2006: para 5e). One of the broad mandates of the HRC is to be ‘responsible  for  promoting  
universal  respect  for  the  protection  of  all  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  for  all’ The aim was 
to provide an alternative to the ‘politicisation’, ‘naming and shaming’ and practices of selectivity which 
contributed to the demise of its predecessor, the Commission for Human Rights (Alston: 2006:185-224). General 
Assembly Resolution 60/251 mandates the HRC, amongst other things, to undertake a universal periodic review 
of all member states in the spirit of cooperation and based on objective and reliable information (UNGAR – 
Human Rights Council 2006: para 5e). The distinctive feature of the UPR, as a cooperative approach to human 
rights implementation, is that it is based entirely on cooperation and dialogue, and is inclusive, collaborative and 
a state-controlled process.  
The review takes place every 4.5 years in three main stages which include the preparation of state reports, review 
of the state in Geneva and the follow-up process. During the review, recommendations are made to the state under 
review by its peers and the state under review has an opportunity to respond or clarify its responses to 
recommendations made during the review. The state under review provides responses to the recommendations 
made, by ‘accepting’ ‘rejecting’ or ‘noting’ the recommendations from its peers. There is no obligation to accept 
the recommendations. While there is a high level of acceptance by states of these UPR recommendations, the 
nature of these recommendations have been criticised for their lack of specificity and are sometimes too general 
to be implemented (McMahon 2012: 26).  
The first cycle of the review (UPR I) spanned from 2008-2011, the second cycle (UPR II) was undertaken from 
2012-2016 and the third cycle (UPR III) will run from 2017-2021). The four major principles underlying the 
review include objectivity, universality, cooperation and complementarity and with the principal objective of 
improving human rights situation on the ground (Human Rights Council: 2006: paras 3-4). States are reviewed 
in accordance with obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, binding human 
rights treaties, voluntary pledges and commitments made by states and applicable international humanitarian law 
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(ibid: para 1-2). The review equally welcomes the participation of NGOs, albeit limited, during the plenary 
session of the HRC when a state report is being adopted. While the UPR mechanism was designed in a similar 
self-regulatory and cooperative fashion as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), they differ in their 
goals with the primary focus of the APRM being to promote accountability and good governance (McMahon et 
al 2013).2   
Some scholars have questioned the efficacy of the UPR, especially the level of state control over the UPR process. 
Scholars and UPR stakeholders critique the UPR from different perspectives in an attempt to provide insights 
into the ability of the UPR mechanism to influence states and improve the human rights situation on the ground. 
I classify the literature into two main groups - the sceptical group and the evolutionary group.  
The sceptical group contends that the UPR mechanism does not add any real value to the human rights system 
because it is flawed, in that it is dependent on the goodwill of states and has a debilitating effect on other human 
rights mechanisms. According to the sceptics, the UPR is institutionally weak and needs to be overhauled, or 
replaced by an entirely new institution that will undertake real scrutiny and hold states accountable for human 
rights violations. For instance, in 2006, UN Watch, one of the earliest critics of the UPR stated that: 
the UN has little need for another toothless mechanism for “cooperative dialogue.” 
We call on Council members to fashion a mechanism that will, in a fair manner, apply 
real scrutiny, to hold governments to account and cite them for violations and abuses 
(UN Watch 2006) 
UN Watch made the above statement during the HRC debate on the modalities for the UPR. It advocated for a 
‘strong’ mechanism that can ‘name and shame’ human rights violations by states and hold them accountable 
(ibid). UN Watch argued that any mechanism based on cooperation and dialogue would be ineffective in 
scrutinising human rights violations by states (ibid). However, adopting the ‘naming and shaming’ approach fails 
to harness the potential value of cooperation and dialogue in helping to cause human changes within states and 
there is evidence which suggests that the ‘naming and shaming’ technique has been ineffective (Rodriguez-Pinero 
2009: 329).  
Allehone M Abebe, Ethiopia’s diplomat in Geneva and a human rights scholar who participated both in the 
negotiations on the institution-building text of the HRC and the first two sessions of the Working Group on the 
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UPR, was very critical of the UPR, particularly the participation of African States (Abebe 2009:3) He argues that 
African States have ‘deftly manipulated’ the system during the formative years to limit NGO participation in the 
process and have engaged in regional dynamics and the politics of bargaining by not criticising one another during 
the review of African states (ibid). According to Abebe (2009:3), the tendency of the African group to use their 
group alliance to circumvent real scrutiny of their human rights situation signals an ominous sign for the efficacy 
of the UPR mechanism. Abebe’s detailed analysis traces the role played by African states during the negotiations 
leading to establishment of the UPR, but on the actual participation of African states during the reviews, his 
analysis was limited only to the first two sessions.3 
Mid-way through the first cycle of the UPR, Frouville (2011: 250-255) criticised the UPR on three major grounds. 
According to Frouville (ibid) and Bernaz (2009: 79-91), the UPR ‘has failed to live up to expectations’ because 
it overshadows the hard work of the treaty bodies and is wholly dependent upon the goodwill of states and cannot, 
as a political entity, make a legal assessment or interpretation of the human rights obligations of states (ibid). 
Similarly, Nowak (2011: 23) argues that the UPR ‘… suffers from the disadvantage that states’ performance in 
the field of human rights is assessed by other states rather than by independent experts.’ For Nowak, the UPR, 
by not permitting special rapporteurs and treaty body experts to participate in the review, undermines the work 
of the treaty bodies and special procedures. The general presumption which underlies the criticisms of Frouville 
and Nowak is that human rights implementation can only be effectively tackled by human rights expert bodies.  
However, their analyses undermine the potential value of the UPR and do not provide empirical data on whether 
the UPR is effective or not in improving the human rights situation of states. 
Scholars within the sceptical group generally have based their views on the UPR and its architecture before the 
actual review started or at best examine a few sessions of the first cycle. Analyses of how the UPR mechanism 
has operated through the first and second complete cycles will provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
its effectiveness. However, scholars within this group provide an important contribution to the knowledge 
regarding the negotiations leading to the establishment of the mechanism, the structure of the mechanism, and 
what must be done or avoided to make it successful. 
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On the other hand, the evolutionary scholars/commentators view the UPR mechanism more positively. They 
contend that the UPR is an important and evolving mechanism whose effectiveness is only limited by factors 
such as politicisation, regionalism, and ritualism (Terman and Voeten, 2018; Carraro, 2017; Charlesworth and 
Larking 2014). This group of scholars actually examine the UPR in action including state practice during the 
interactive dialogue and the recommendations made during the review process. McMahon (2012: 1-28) undertook 
one of the first empirical analyses of the UPR. He analysed the first cycle of the UPR focusing on the quality and 
quantity of UPR recommendations and the responses by states. He found that the UPR offers tangible benefits to 
human rights promotion by attracting universal and high-level state engagement and encouraging dialogue 
between some governments and civil society (ibid, McMahon and Ascherio 2012:231-248). However, McMahon 
criticised the lack of specificity and the complimentary approach adopted mostly by the African and Asian Groups 
in the review of their regional peers. Eventually he has expressed optimism that the UPR will evolve into a robust 
mechanism because states are taking the process seriously (ibid).  
The analysis of McMahon was ultimately a general evaluation of states’ UPR I participation in the interactive 
dialogue, the quality of state recommendations and the corresponding state response. In 2008, Elvira Dominquez 
Redondo, undertook a similar assessment to that of McMahon and drew a similar conclusion in relation to high 
level state engagement with the UPR (Redondo 2008: 729).  However, she conceded that the effectiveness of the 
mechanism would only be determined by the extent to which state participation in the UPR process improves the 
human rights situation on the ground, an assessment which was too early for her to make (ibid: 733).  
Since 2012, Smith (2012, 2014), Quane (2015) and Bulto (2015), have analysed the impact of the UPR in different 
regions. Smith’s 2012 case study of Pacific Island states demonstrated that these states actively engaged with the 
interactive dialogue of their reviews during UPR I and were receptive to UPR recommendations. Smith however 
pointed to the fact that their engagement was limited by their inability to participate in the review of other states 
due to technical and financial constraints (Smith 2012: 529). With regards to the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN4 states), Quane (2015: 289) argued that the UPR mechanism has enhanced the relationship 
between ASEAN states and the global human rights mechanisms. According to Quane, the UPR impacts other 
mechanisms by making particular recommendations which have increased their engagement with the UN treaty 
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bodies and special procedures (ibid). But Quane’s case study highlighted the fact that disagreements on the death 
penalty and the rights of LGBT persons have limited the engagement of many states in the region (ibid: 289-295).  
In Bulto’s 2015 general analysis on Africa, he found that African states engage more with the UPR mechanism 
than with other human rights mechanisms because of the almost complete control they have over the outcome of 
the UPR process (Bulto 2015). But he argues that their engagement lacks genuine commitment and is a 
manifestation of rights ritualism (ibid). Bulto (2015: 247-251) supports his claim by the fact that the African 
group lobbied for a state-driven system that limits NGO participation and by their failure to be critical of the 
human rights situation of their peers during the reviews. Nevertheless, he intimated that the continuous 
engagement of African states with the UPR, although ritualistic, can contribute to enhance the learning-by-
participation process (ibid: 255). 
Little of the existing scholarship takes a theoretical approach to analysing the UPR process. Charlesworth and 
Larking (2015) provided the first sustained analysis of the UPR process that draws on socio-legal theory and 
underscore the interplay of rituals and ritualism in the UPR. They examined rights ritualism as one of the core 
challenges to the central aspect of the UPR process. Charlesworth (2010: 12) argues that ‘in the field of human 
rights, rights ritualism is a more common response than an outright rejection of human rights standards and 
institutions.’ According to Charlesworth (ibid), ‘rights ritualism’ is ‘a way of embracing the language of human 
rights precisely to deflect real human rights scrutiny and to avoid accountability for human rights abuses.’ In the 
context of the UPR, Charlesworth and Larking (2015: 16) define ritualism as ‘participation in the process of 
reports and meetings but an indifference to, or even reluctance about, increasing the protection of human rights.’ 
They identify elements of cynicism in states’ involvement during the interactive dialogue phase of the review 
and argue that some states have claimed they recognise certain rights within their states when that is not the case 
(ibid: 14-15). In contrast to Charlesworth and Larking, Milewicz and Goodin (2016: 1-21) argue that the UPR is 
a deliberative success for peer-to-peer accountability because of its insistently cooperative and inclusive character 
which can facilitate a genuine discussion of existing human rights violations. According to Milewicz and Goodin 
(ibid: 17), the interactive dialogue phase involving states, and to a limited extent civil society, effectively induces 
a cooperative and deliberative culture within the mechanism that is encouraging states to comply with human 
rights standards. This article takes a different theoretical perspective in analysing state engagement with the UPR 
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process by examining the potential for the UPR to lead to improved human rights changes over time through the 
process of acculturation. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
International scholars have extensively engaged with the question of why and when states obey international law. 
International law and international relations scholars have developed various theories to explain and answer this 
question, but each arrived at mixed results (Heifer 2002, Koh 1996, Koh 1997, Guzman 2002, Guzman 2008, 
Posner 2014, Bates 2014). At the heart of this discourse is the problem of compliance. In the context of 
international human rights law, scholars have engaged with the specific question of whether ratification of human 
rights treaties has any effect on state behaviour. While some studies found that treaties have improved state 
behaviour (Simmons 2009, Lupu 2013, Hafner-Burton 2013) others found that treaties have no positive effect 
and sometimes even a negative effect (Hathaway 2002, Neumayer 2005, Hill 2010, Posner 2014). However, 
Roger Fisher’s work differs from these studies by making a distinction between first and second-order 
compliance. According to Fisher (1981: 28-29), ‘first order compliance’ relates to compliance with treaties while 
‘second-order compliance’ deals with compliance with the decisions and recommendations of institutions 
monitoring compliance with international treaties. The above studies focused on ‘first order compliance’ and 
until recently, little attention has been paid to ‘second-order-compliance’.5 This article examines the potential 
impact of the UPR as human rights monitoring mechanism from a theoretical perspective. 
This section reviews five main theories on state compliance with international human rights law – the coercive 
compliance-centred theory; ‘naming and shaming’; the transnational legal process theory; the five-stage ‘spiral 
model’; and the acculturation theory. This section critiques each of the theoretical approaches after outlining them 
in order to justify my preference for the theory of acculturation. This review is not exhaustive in coverage of 
compliance theories. It rather focuses on the theories that are relevant to my argument and important in framing 
the debate. The argument here is that the UPR mechanism, which relies on state dialogue and cooperation, 
embodies a sophisticated human right approach whose impact cannot be appreciated by compliance theories that 
incorporate elements of coercion/confrontation. The coercive compliance-centred theory and other theories that 
incorporate elements of coercion are not suitable for assessing the UPR or other human rights cooperative 
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mechanisms. Furthermore, this section argues that the acculturation theory provides a more appropriate 
alternative theoretical framework through which to understand the potential impact of the UPR process. This is 
because the acculturation theory does not incorporate any element of coercion or material inducement but focuses 
on the various social and cognitive pressures that influence states. This theory is most suitable in evaluating a 
monitoring mechanism that tends to be inclusive, cooperative and collaborative. I argue that the UPR is such a 
mechanism and can influence human rights changes within states in a non-confrontational manner.  
i. The Coercive Compliance-Centred Theory 
The theoretical starting point of this research follows the argument that human rights compliance mechanisms 
that rely exclusively on coercive/confrontational approaches are limited and undermine the potential benefit of 
cooperative mechanisms. Proponents of a coercive compliance-centred theory hold onto the traditional notion 
that coercive mechanisms are the principal means to induce state compliance with human rights. According to 
this view, compliance with human rights norms occurs when powerful states coerce relatively weak states into 
complying either through sanctions, punitive or other confrontational measures (Hathaway 2002:1934-2034). 
Many scholars within international relations theory share this view and contend that human rights norms will be 
enforced only to the extent that it is in the strategic interest of powerful states to enforce them (Baumgartner 
2011: 447, Slaughter 2011, Guzman 2002:1826).  
While the views of international relations scholars rely on the power of states to enforce human rights norms, 
international legal scholars generally rely on ‘powerful’ institutions to coerce states into compliance. According 
to Steiner (2000: 20), ‘[i]nstitutions make rights more effective by threatening or taking actions that may lead a 
state to comply. Institutions with real power cut to the bone of sovereignty.’ Based on this view, Steiner (ibid: 
15-53) argues that the UN Human Rights Committee will require restructuring to address its compliance problem. 
But the UN treaty bodies in general cannot be characterised as coercive because they do not have the power to 
compel states to comply with their findings or recommendations. Viewing international monitoring institutions 
with this compliance-centred optic has led many scholars to regard the monitoring institutions as basically weak 
and ineffective underscoring their inability to meaningfully advance human rights (Crawford 2000: 1-12, 
Moravsik 2000: 219, Mutua 1994: 212). While there have been several proposals to strengthen the human rights 
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treaty body monitoring system (Pillay 2012, Egan 2013), De Frouville (2011: 264) argues that the development 
of the treaty bodies has reached its limits. To address the deficiencies of the UN human rights system, Frouville 
(ibid: 264-265) advocates for the creation of a World Commission of Human Rights with a strong institutional 
basis and the power to issue and enforce binding decisions. Similar desire for stronger and more confrontational 
approaches to human rights compliance is reflected in the argument that the best final model for securing human 
rights compliance is the establishment of a world court of human rights (Clapham 2012: 318, Nowak 2007: 251, 
Nowak 2011: 26-33). For example, Nowak argues it is time for a world court of human rights because UN treaty 
bodies and other monitoring mechanisms have had little impact owing to their inability to issue and enforce 
binding decisions that would induce state compliance (Nowak 2011: 26). 
The above arguments are not without merit. They are founded on the premise that human rights norms have a 
normative force. Hence failure to comply ought to attract a degree of ‘penalty’; international human rights 
monitoring bodies do not have the competence to punish right violators or provide direct redress to victims of 
rights violation. It has also been argued that the monitoring process involves legal questions which political bodies 
like the UPR Mechanism are ill equipped to deal with (De Frouville 2011: 254). This helps explain the above call 
for a judicial articulation of rights by a judicial body, the violation of which should attract punitive sanctions that 
will secure compliance. However, not all scholars agree. Goldenziel (2014: 453) underscores the need for 
flexibility in enforcing human rights norms. Goldenzeil (2014: 460-461), like Helfer (2002: 1832), argues that 
the ‘overlegalisation’ of international human rights law through rigid enforcement mechanisms can have a 
potential backlash. Drawing on the examples of Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, Helfer (2002) argues 
that when international human rights law is ‘overlegalized’ it will create a domestic backlash that may cause 
states to withdraw from a human rights regime. I argue that the UPR mechanism provides much needed flexibility 
through its cooperative, rather than adjudicative, framework, and that the potential value of a cooperative 
mechanism to human rights implementation cannot be underestimated.  
Within the governance matrix, Vega and Lewis (2011: 353-385) argue that the UPR has the potential to transform 
human rights discourse. They take the view that the UPR introduces a distinctive environment that encourages 
human rights policy diffusion and the sharing of best practices among member states (ibid: 357). According to 
Redondo and McMahon (2013: 61-97), more cooperative and inclusive approaches to human rights 
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implementation can provide a middle ground between universalism and national sovereignty. They argue that 
voluntary and cooperative approaches if properly utilised can have a ‘prophylactic effect’ in promoting human 
rights and help reduce the number of instances that would require ‘interventionist’ actions (ibid: 88-97). Vega 
and Lewis (2011: 363) described the UPR as a ‘soft’ accountability mechanism that enables members to adjust 
their national practices in conformity with shared ideas on how effectively to manage human rights in the 21st 
century. 
Exclusive reliance on ‘strong’ compliance mechanisms, whether through sanctions or adjudication, not only 
undermines the potential value of cooperative mechanisms, but also has significant limitations and negative 
impact on human rights. Empirical studies have well documented the adverse impact of economic sanctions on 
human rights (Wood 2008: 489-513, Peksen 2009: 59-77, Bennouna 2002: 40-47)). Empirical analysis from 
1981-2000 concluded that ‘economic sanctions deteriorate citizens’ physical integrity rights’ (Peksen 2009: 59) 
especially when directed towards dictatorial regimes (Careniero and Dominique 2009:969, Shagabutdinova and 
Berejikian 2007: 59-74, Dresner 2011: 96). Recent empirical studies equally indicate that even the so-called 
‘targeted sanctions’ have unintended adverse consequences on the respect for human rights (Carneiro and 
Apolinario 2016: 565-589, Ingold 2013, Afesorgbor and Mahadevan 2016, Targeted Sanctions Consortium et al. 
2013). Carneiro and Apolinário (2016) analysed targeted sanctions against African states between the years 1992-
2008. Their findings indicate that targeted sanctions had similar adverse effects as conventional sanctions, and 
that the level of human rights protection in the country is likely to worsen under an episode of targeted sanction 
(ibid: 565-589). Africa is the most sanctioned continent in the world and yet there is little improvement on the 
human rights situation on the ground (Charron 2013: 77-98). This is an indication that this coercive compliance 
paradigm has not been effective in the continent. More recently, the threat by the British government to coerce 
African states to decriminalise same-sex relationships by withholding UK aid from governments that do not 
reform legislation banning homosexuality, have been subsequently met with specific legislation further 
criminalising same sex unions in some countries like Nigeria and Uganda (Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act 
2013, Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014). Legal theorists and social psychologists have reasoned that if the 
ultimate goal of the international human rights system is to improve the human rights situation on the ground, 
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then voluntary obedience, not coerced compliance, must be the preferred mechanism of enforcement (Koh 1997: 
2645, Tyler 2006, Paternoster et al. 1983: 457).  
This article does not seek to undermine the significance of other human rights mechanism in many instances but 
rather argues that more attention needs to be given to the potential value of cooperative human rights mechanisms, 
which could complement other existing human rights mechanisms. The UPR mechanism which relies on 
cooperation and gives the state some degree of control over the process can be sometimes at least as, if not more, 
effective than coercive mechanisms. 
ii. The ‘Naming and Shaming’ Approach 
Compliance mechanisms based on the coercion model are unsatisfactory in explaining state engagement with the 
UN treaty monitoring bodies. This is because the treaty bodies do not have the power to compel states to comply 
with their findings or recommendations. ‘Naming and shaming’ is one of the predominant approaches engaged 
by the UN human rights monitoring bodies (Redondo 2008: 687). As pointed out by Ulfstein (2014), UN human 
rights treaty bodies have no coercive power except for ‘naming and shaming.’ This approach relies on expressing 
public disapproval of a state’s non-compliance with its international human rights obligations and has been used 
by most of the UN human rights machinery. In the case of the treaty bodies, the sanctions available in the event 
of non-compliance are limited, for the most part, to ‘naming and shaming’ (Alston 1996: paras 10-12). This 
involves public reporting of the violation and possibly condemnation. While the findings by the relevant experts 
may be justified, states at the receiving end of the scrutiny tend to perceive such an approach as confrontational 
and they dismiss the finding as a foreign imposition. This is, in some way, the result of the fact that mechanisms 
like the treaty bodies and special procedures rely on human rights experts and engage in a highly technical review 
process. This has been seen to contribute to low state engagement with human rights bodies and a seemingly low 
rates of state conformity with their recommendations and findings (UNHCHR 2012). Even though the 
independent treaty body experts are nominated by states, the fact that they are not peers sometimes helps create 
the perception of ‘us’ as in states versus ‘them’ as in human rights experts.  
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Redondo classifies ‘naming and shaming’ as a confrontational approach, especially when it calls for a country-
specific resolution or requests country-specific actions (Redondo 2008: 687). African states, as well as many 
other states, have repeatedly condemned findings and resolutions which target the human rights practices of 
specific states or regions, arguing that they breed selectivity and double-standards (Redondo 2011:274-5). For 
example, South Africa adheres to the belief that ‘naming and shaming’ is counterproductive and has at various 
times voted against country-specific resolutions condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, Sudan, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Jordaan 2014: 100-109). In 2006, the African Group in the HRC opposed 
a strong HRC action on Darfur in favour of a fact-finding mission and wanted the mission to consist of state 
representatives, reflecting their dislike of independent experts (Statement by Algeria 2006). In March 2009, an 
attempt by the EU to reinstate the country mandate on the DRC through as draft HRC resolution was opposed by 
the African Group who later introduced its own resolution which was eventually adopted (International Service 
for Human Rights 2006: 7). The African Group’s resolution neither condemned the DRC government nor made 
any call for the establishment of a country mandate on the DRC.  
According to the African Group, the HRC’s founding principle of non-selectivity is opposed to selective country-
specific resolutions which contributed to the demise of the former Commission for Human Rights (Statement by 
Algeria). Algeria, on behalf of the African Group, stated that ‘[o]ne of the reasons why the Commission was not 
successful was because of the naming and shaming [of states]’ (ibid). The opposition of African states to ‘naming 
and shaming’ through country-specific resolutions partly stems from their view that it is a neo-colonial tool 
having little to do with human rights concerns (Freedman 2013: 18). Lebovic and Voeten (2006: 861-888) 
examined ‘naming and shaming’ by the former UN Commission for Human Rights from 1977-2001. They found 
evidence of bias as over half of the resolutions condemning human rights abuses only targeted Israel, Chile, South 
Africa, Equatorial Guinea and Cambodia, and avoided public condemnation of politically powerful countries like 
China and Saudi Arabia (ibid). 
As argued in this article, there is the need for a more inclusive and cooperative approach and the UPR mechanism 
provides such a platform. According to Surya Subedi, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in Cambodia, a more constructive approach focusing on cooperation among peers towards improving human 
rights rather than naming and shaming, would help dissipate ‘the perception of “us” versus “them” held by states 
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in relation to human rights experts (Subedi 2011: 228). This approach, he noted, is supported by developing states 
(ibid). Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vieira de Mello, also observed that ‘it is not 
enough to blame. It is also necessary to help governments or regimes to emerge from their own mistakes or their 
own contradictions’ (Pinheiro 2011: 167). 
Moreover, the ‘naming and shaming’ approach to human rights implementation has largely been seen as a failure 
(Friman 2015, Adcock 2015: 1-14, Gates and Reich 2010: 4., Willmot et al. 2016). Hafner-Burton (2008: 689-
716) analysed the relationship between ‘naming and shaming’ and the human rights practices of 145 states. She 
finds that perpetrators do not change their human rights practices after being shamed and sometimes instead ramp 
up those abuses. According to Haidi Willmot et al (2016: 369), human rights strategies cannot be limited to 
‘naming and shaming.’ They argue that the limited strategy of blaming the Sri Lanka government for the human 
rights abuses during the conflict (2002-2009) contributed to the UN’s failure to protect the rights of civilians 
during the conflict (ibid). International scholars have underscored the tendency of states to react to threats by 
redefining ‘their interests in the direction of resisting the threat,’ and that extrinsic incentives in the form of 
rewards or punishment undermine the intrinsic motivations of states to comply (Goodman and Jinks 2004: 689, 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 558). This trade long-term commitment in favour of short-term compliance (ibid).  
Many scholars have argued that ‘naming and shaming’ is less effective today than in the 1970s when it was first 
used (Hafner-Burton 2008: 707-713, Mallinder 2010: 174). Roth criticises the ‘naming and shaming’ 
methodology of international organisations as ineffective, particularly for addressing violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights because these rights have limited clarity about violation and remedy (Roth 2006: 173-
4). Molly Land argues that if ‘naming and shaming’ is a limited technique, consideration should be given to other 
approaches ‘given the urgency of addressing human rights violations resulting from global inequalities’ (Land 
2016: 416). These concerns have given rise to calls for new approaches to monitoring human rights compliance, 
particularly in the context of socio-economic rights (Cockery and Way 2012: 330, Rubenstein 2004: 849, 
Robinson 2004: 870).  Socio-economic rights have figured prominently among state recommendations to their 
peers in the UPR process. About 10% of the total recommendations made by states during UPR I was on socio-
economic rights and more than 12% during UPR II (UPR Info 2018). Also, within the African context, it doubtful 
how the ‘naming and shaming’ approach can be an effective tool in achieving decriminalisation of same-sex 
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relationships against the argument of cultural relativism. In a gay rights debate at the UN Human Rights Council, 
the Nigerian delegate to the UN Human Rights Council stated on behalf of the African group (excluding South 
Africa): 
  the Nigerian delegate on behalf of the African Group (excluding South Africa) stated that: 
The heads of states of governments of the African Union … resolved not to … accept or 
integrate concepts which have not been universally defined and accepted in international 
human rights law. The African leaders thereby rescind the obsession by other regions or 
groups to impose their own value system on other regions (Statement by Mr. Ositadinma 
Anaedu, 22 March 2011). 
 
The Asian region has asserted cultural relativism on the premise of ‘Asian values’ which has continued to 
influence political and judicial thinking in Southeast Asian states like Malaysia and Singapore (Lee 2016). While 
there is no similar collective approach taken by African states, they have, almost unanimously, opposed same-
sex relationship on the basis that it is culturally unacceptable or a form of cultural imperialism. The UPR provides 
a new approach to address these issues and its potential impact cannot be gauged by compliance theories that are 
confrontational.  
Rodrigues-Pinero draws a connection between the general failure of the human rights system to elicit compliance 
and its predominant naming and shaming approach (Rodrigues-Pinero 2009: 329). He observes ‘that the 
effectiveness of the “name and shame” techniques has long been superseded by crude facts’ (ibid). Rodrigues-
Pinero advocates for a more sophisticated approach to rights implementation which focuses on cooperation, 
empowers rights-holders, reinforces duty-bearers’ capacities and the role of technical cooperation (ibid: 330). 
This article argues that the UPR mechanism embodies this sophisticated approach by emphasizing state 
cooperation as the cornerstone of the mechanism. Some may argue that the deliberations that take place during 
the interactive dialogue phase of the UPR is a form of ‘naming and shaming’. However, this does not fully 
matchup with the conventional understanding of the ‘naming and shaming’ approach which involve singling out 
states and publicly condemning their poor human rights record. Most of the state deliberations during the UPR 
process utilise language which is more encouraging and recommendatory, rather than condemnatory. This to an 
extend has been a subject of criticism by some scholars.  The ‘naming and shaming’ approach is a particularly 
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unsuitable framework for the UPR because the aim for the establishment of the HRC and its UPR mechanism 
was to provide an alternative to the ‘naming and shaming’ and practices of selectivity which contributed to the 
demise of the former Commission for Human Rights (Alston 2006: 185-224, UNGAR 60/251: para 5e). It would, 
therefore, be inappropriate to assess the impact of the UPR process by the same framework that it sought to avoid, 
although the extent to which it has succeeded to avoid ‘naming and shaming’ may be the subject of debate. 
iii. The Transnational Legal Process Theory 
The transnational legal process theory propounded by Harold Koh holds that the way to achieve compliance with 
international law is through the repeated participation of states in a variety of law-creating and interpreting fora 
which results in the internalisation or domestication of norms (Koh 199: 181, Koh, 2005: 350-315). Koh makes 
a distinction between three forms of norm internalisation: social, political and legal (Koh 1998: 642). Social 
internalisation occurs when there is widespread adherence to a norm as a result of that norm acquiring public 
legitimacy (ibid). With political internalisation, the government accepts an international norm as a matter of 
policy (ibid). Legal internalisation occurs when the international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal 
system either via executive action, legislation, judicial interpretation or a combination of the three (ibid). 
Central to the transnational legal process theory are the successive processes of interaction, interpretation and 
internalisation. In the context of human rights law compliance, Koh contends that compliance is ultimately 
achieved as a result of the repeated process of interaction, interpretation and internalisation through which 
international human rights norms are ‘obeyed’ (complied with) (Koh 1999: 1411). The interaction and 
interpretation processes are triggered by non-state actors in an effort to compel the state to implement the findings 
or recommendations of human rights mechanisms. The treaty monitoring or international adjudicative monitoring 
bodies then serve as an interpretive community which defines or clarifies the definition of the relevant norms and 
their violation (ibid: 1410). The state then achieves legal internalisation through the constitution or other domestic 
law; political internalisation by incorporating the norm into governmental policy; and social internalisation when 
the norm acquires public legitimacy (ibid, Stevens 2012: 190). 
17 
 
The transnational legal process theory is a comprehensive theory. As Kent argues, it is an inclusive theory in a 
structural sense because ‘it comprehends all levels of state and non-state interaction, influence, and compliance 
– the international and the domestic, the vertical and the horizontal’ (Kent 2007: 10). However, the transnational 
legal process theory is limited in many respects. According to Guzman (2008: 1835-1836), the transnational legal 
theory fails to explain why states comply with international human rights law but rather it provides an empirical 
pathway to compliance. While legal internalisation can be achieved through constitutionalisation of human rights 
norms, Koh’s theory does not explain how to ultimately achieve social and political internalisation. It fails to 
account for the process by which a norm acquires public legitimacy. As argued below, the theory of acculturation 
fills this gap by identifying the cognitive and social pressures that drive states to adopt socially legitimate 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (social and political internalisation). Koh (2005: 977) acknowledges this 
limitation of his theory and argues that the theory of acculturation closes the gap by identifying the micro 
processes of social influence that affects his process of ‘norm internalisation’. 
Also, while the UPR provides an interactive process, through a three and a half hour long interactive dialogue 
(Phase II of the UPR), it does not provide a forum for the interpretation of the relevant international law.  In the 
UPR, states only make human rights recommendations to peers and do not undertake a legal interpretation or 
clarification of the content of those rights. Koh’s theory does not explain whether any of the three forms of 
internalisation (legal, political and social) can occur in the absence of an interpretive community or a law 
declaring forum to create, legally interpret or clarify the relevant rights. States tend to be less cooperative with 
such interpretive and law declaring fora. This contributes to their limited, and sometimes insignificant impact on 
states, as highlighted at the beginning of this second part of the article.  
The UPR is a non-adjudicative and non-confrontational mechanism which does not serve as an interpretive 
community. It would, therefore, not be possible for the UPR mechanism to undertake technical interpretation or 
clarification of certain rights which are contested such as the rights of sexual minorities contested by the African 
group as earlier highlighted. As such, the transnational legal process theory does not provide a suitable theoretical 
framework to understand the impact of the UPR process on the human rights situation on the ground. 
Nevertheless, Koh (1997: 2648) notes that the various theoretical explanations for compliance are 
complementary, not mutually exclusive. The process of interaction in the transnational legal process theory which 
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includes the participation of both state and non-state actors is an important component of the five-stage spiral 
model and underscores the significance of NGO participation in the UPR process. 
iv. The Five Stage Spiral Model 
The spiral model was developed by Risse et al to explain how states ultimately come to comply with human rights 
norms (Risse et al. 1999, Risse et al. 2013). The central tenet of the spiral model is that the diffusion of 
international human rights norms that results in domestic change is dependent on the power of transnational 
human rights pressures exerted by national and transnational advocacy networks (Risse et al. 1999: 11). The 
spiral model examines the process by which international norms are internalised and implemented domestically, 
with governments, transnational societies and domestic civil societies as key actors (ibid). This theory captures 
the moral strength of human rights ideas and the central role of domestic and transnational non-governmental 
actors in shaping the decisions of states to comply with international human rights norms. However, the 
significance of the spiral-model in relation to explaining the potential impact of the UPR is limited by the 
incorporation of coercion and ‘naming and shaming’ approaches at some stages of the model. 
In the spiral model, there are five phases to human rights change. The first phase of the spiral model begins when 
there is repression by authoritarian regimes (Risse el al. 2013: 5-6). The situation progresses to the second phase 
when transnational advocacy groups exert pressure on the state to recognise human rights (ibid). This places the 
state on the international spotlight. In the second phase, once the repressive state has been put on the international 
agenda, the state, in order to avoid international scrutiny and diffuse pressure, raises the flag of national 
sovereignty by claiming that its behaviour is not subject to international scrutiny (ibid). The target state remains 
in denial about the validity of human rights norms and rejects the demands of international groups (ibid). It is at 
this phase that coercive strategies in the form of economic sanctions, and ‘naming and shaming’ are employed.  
As pressure increases from both domestic and transnational actors, the targeted state enters into the third phase 
of the spiral model by making some ‘tactical concessions’ or ‘cosmetic’ changes such as signing international 
treaties (ibid). This ushers the state into the fourth phase of the spiral model known as ‘prescriptive status.’ This 
is characterised by state recognition of the validity of human rights norms through the establishment of human 
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rights institutions and domestic law reforms (ibid). This is a result of state interaction with the interpretive and 
law declaring fora at the international law – the first two stages of Koh’s transnational legal process theory. By 
becoming a party to an international human rights treaty, which Risse et al argue is a consequence of 
domestic/international pressure and other exogenous factors, the state achieves what Koh refers to as legal 
internalisation.  
The fifth phase is ultimately achieved through the institutionalisation and habitualisation of human rights norms 
(ibid: 8). This is characterised by conformity and sustained compliance with international human rights norms 
(ibid). This is in line with Koh’s concepts of social and political internalisation, but while Rise et al argue from 
an international relations standpoint of norm socialisation, Koh argues from an international law perspective of 
norm internalisation. Nevertheless, neither Koh nor Rise et al address the micro processes that influence social 
and political internalisation (socialisation). 
The spiral model offers important insights into the process of change in repressive states. It recognises the 
importance of human rights discourse, and the central role of non-governmental actors. It has been tested in over 
20 case studies (Risse et al. 1999, Risse et al. 2013, Fleay 2006, Shaid and Yerbury 2014, Anaya 2009, Alhargan 
2014). Krommendijk (2015: 492) argues that unlike coercion, the spiral model provides a satisfactory theoretical 
framework to explain the effectiveness of the UN human rights treaty bodies. Based on empirical analysis on the 
study of The Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland, Krommendijk contends that the greater the level of 
transnational NGO mobilisation, the higher the effectiveness of the concluding observations of the treaty bodies 
(ibid: 504-508). Another relevant aspect of this model is the recognition of the significance of civil society/NGO 
engagement in human rights mechanisms. 
However, the spiral model has theoretical shortcomings and is an inappropriate theoretical framework to consider 
the impact of state engagement with the UPR Mechanism. As pointed out by Eran Shor, Risse et al consider that 
once the spiral process has started, there can be no regression because violations are bound to decrease (Shor 
2008: 5-6. According to Shor (ibid), Risse et al fail to closely look into the possibilities of regression and to 
consider the role of serious conflicts and security threats in shaping states’ repressive policies and hindering norm 
compliance. When conflicts within or between states pose a threat to the nation and/or citizens, governments 
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easily justify repressive measures and human rights considerations are weakened. In 1999, Morocco was 
transitioning to the 4th phase of the spiral model (Risse et al. 1999: 125). However in 2003, it reverted to 
repression. After the May 2003 terrorist attack in Casablanca, Morocco, the government passed new anti-
terrorism laws and resumed death sentences and torture (between 2000 to 5000 arrests were carried out and 17 
of the 903 persons convicted were sentenced to death) (Dakwa 2004: 25). The increased threat of terrorism 
globally is an issue not addressed by the spiral model and there has been evidence which proves that terrorism 
significantly diminishes states’ respect for basic human rights (Dreher et al. 2010: 65-93, Shor et al. 2014: 294-
317, Shor et al. 2016: 104-121).  
Moreover, the fact that the spiral model incorporates elements of coercion/confrontation in the second and third 
phases makes it an inappropriate theory to test the impact of a mechanism based entirely on cooperation. These 
two phases are characterised by pressure, denunciation, and shaming which, as argued earlier in this article, have 
been proven to be ineffective. In addition, the five-stage spiral model is only focused on civil and political rights 
and covers a very limited subset of human rights issues. Consequently, the impact of the UPR mechanism with 
cooperation as its hallmark cannot be adequately explained by the five-stage spiral model although aspects of the 
model that underscore the significant role of NGOs/CSOs are relevant when considering the impact of the UPR 
mechanism. 
v. The Theory of Acculturation  
Theories of human rights compliance which integrate coercive or confrontational strategies do not account for 
acculturation. Acculturation was first defined in 1936 as ‘those phenomena which result when groups of 
individuals sharing different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the 
original culture patterns of either or both groups’ (Redfield et al. 1936: 973-1002). A psychologist’s perspective 
to the term acculturation was later provided by Graves who described acculturation as changes to an individual’s 
identity, attitudes and values resulting from his contact with other cultures (Graves 1967: 338). In 2004 and 2005, 
Goodman and Jinks (2004) transferred the concept of acculturation to states and international regimes. They 
define acculturation as ‘the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the 
surrounding culture, without actively assessing either the merits of those beliefs and behaviours or the material 
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costs and benefits of conforming to them’ (ibid: 626). Goodman and Jinks argue that their theory of acculturation 
is ‘an extension of Koh’s and other’s work on transnational norm diffusion’ which they intend to supplement by 
‘isolating the micro processes of social influence’ (ibid). Acculturation, as used by Goodman and Jinks, therefore 
draws on a relationship between law and sociology, in contrast to the five stage spiral model influenced by 
international relations theory. 
The theory of acculturation calls into question the view that compliance with human rights norms is best induced 
by the exercise of coercive power or by binding decisions emanating from human rights monitoring institutions. 
Central to the acculturation theory is that power is not merely prohibitive, material and centralised but also 
productive, cultural and diffuse (Goodman and Jinks 2013: 122). Goodman and Jinks argue that mechanisms 
based on coercion are inadequate because coercion ‘fails to grasp the complexity of the social environment within 
which states act’ (ibid). Monitoring and reporting are highly effective and important functions in an acculturation-
based institutional regime, while sanctions and binding decisions are potentially counterproductive (ibid: 699). 
The acculturation approach shows preference for ‘soft law’ mechanisms but does not call for a complete 
abandonment of coercive mechanisms. Rather, it argues that acculturation, like coercion, is more likely to succeed 
and more likely to fail under certain conditions or when combined with other mechanisms (Goodman and Jinks 
2005: 991).  
The micro-processes of acculturation which include mimicry, identity and status maximisation propel cognitive 
and social pressures which drive a state to adopt socially legitimate attitudes, beliefs and behaviours (Goodman 
and Jinks 2013: 639-642). By identifying themselves with a reference group, states generate varying degrees of 
social and cognitive pressures to conform to the norms of that group (ibid). The social environment within which 
states act propels internal cognitive and social pressures which drive a state to adopt socially legitimate attitudes 
and beliefs. The adoption of socially legitimate attitudes, beliefs and behaviours by states can contribute to the 
attainment of what Koh calls social and political norm internalisation. In his review on the theory of acculturation, 
Koh (2005: 977) validates the theory of acculturation as a case study of internalisation through socialisation. He 
argues that by focusing on acculturation over coercion, Goodman and Jinks unmask a new approach to influence 
state compliance with human rights law through a ‘complex interaction between process and ideas’ (ibid).  
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Therefore, Koh’s transnational legal process theory is not necessarily antithetical to the theory of acculturation 
as both theories could co-exist and reinforce each other. 
Social and cognitive pressures can push the language of human rights into some moral commitments within 
particular cultures even in terms that challenge one or more aspects of that culture. Gregg (2010: 289) has 
employed a cognitive approach rather than a normative one to show how human rights norms can be advanced 
as rights internal to any given community’s culture by means of cognitive re-framing.  He argues that ‘an idea 
once external can become internal through system-level learning’ (ibid). While examining the issue of female 
genital mutilation in Africa, he noted that a cognitive rule can be deployed that revises local normative rules that 
justify female genital mutilation, but that such a cognitive rule has to be locally owned (ibid: 304).  For example, 
reframing female genital mutilation as a technical, health issue rather than a normative human rights concern, can 
advance the human rights issue as internal to the African culture.   
Another example of the potential for social and cognitive pressures in the UPR process to influence states is the 
problem of cultural relativism to the realisation of human rights. Cultural relativism, in relation to the issue of 
sexual orientation, is an issue found to have impacted the UPR engagment of African and Asian states examined 
during UPR I and II (Quane 2015, Etone 2017, Etone 2018). With the exception of Madagascar, no African state 
made a recommendation to its African peer on sexual orientation, and an overwhelming majority of the 
recommendations on the issue made by non-African states to African states were rejected. African states received 
the highest number of UPR recommendations on the issue of sexual orientation but the African states rejecting 
the recommendations often stated that same sex unions were culturally unacceptable or an affront to African 
values and in some cases an imposition of western values on them (Human Rights Council – Kenya 2008: para 
714). 
Nevertheless, there could be an ‘African’ way to incrementally realise the rights of sexual minorities within the 
context of the UPR by focusing on soft recommendations which seek to transform the social and political culture 
against sexual minorities. Approaches that employ coercion or require immediate normative solutions have either 
experienced a backlash or have been inadequate. For example in 2011, Human Rights Watch published a report 
that found a dichotomy between the constitutional ideals and public attitude towards sexual minorities in South 
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Africa (Human Rights Watch 2011: 1). The report indicated that despite the constitutional protection on the rights 
of the LGBT community, discrimination against them remained institutionalised in the communities, families 
and state institutions (ibid: 14-15). There is also evidence that calls for immediate decriminalisation or threats, 
such as the threat by the British government to withhold UK aid from governments that do not reform legislation 
banning homosexuality, have been subsequently met with specific legislation further criminalising same sex 
unions in some countries like Nigeria and Uganda (Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act 2013, Uganda Anti-
Homosexuality Act 2014).  
Within the context of the UPR, soft recommendations such as raising public awareness and sensitization on the 
need for decriminalisation can help transform the current public support against decriminalisation and 
subsequently pave the way for normative solutions that would enjoy public support. Also, applying Gregg’s 
cognitive re-framing approach, states could find ways to advance the rights of sexual minorities as rights internal 
to the African culture by means of cognitive re-framing. While African states such as Sao Tome and Principe, 
Ghana, and Cameroon have been receptive to UPR recommendations that require them to condemn, investigate 
acts of violence against LGBT people or to raise public awareness and sensitisation on LGBT rights, they were 
not receptive to recommendations for immediate decriminalisation, arguably because of the enormous public 
support against decriminalisation. 
The UPR through its social and cognitive pressures can contribute to transform the belief that same sex 
relationships are un-African and an imposition of ‘white Euro-American sexual norms and gender expressions’ 
(Ekine 2013: 78). There may be an ‘African’ way for realising the rights of sexual minorities within the context 
of the UPR by focusing on recommendations which seek to transform the social and political culture against 
sexual minorities. Such an approach that focuses on transforming the social and political culture through social 
and cognitive pressures can contribute to incrementally improving the human rights situation on the ground. This 
can contribute to achieving the social and political internalisation which propels Koh’s process of norm 
internalisation. This is particularly relevant in the context of South Africa where ‘the vast majority of South 
Africans’ condemn sexual minorities, despite progressive policies and interpretation of the protection of the rights 
of sexual minorities in the South African Constitution (Devji 2016: 4, Goodsell 2007: 110). 
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However, there has been evidence of ritualism and politicisation in the UPR process. While these were not the 
focus of this article, they have the potential to undermine the impact of the UPR process and its ability to influence 
states (Etone 2017: 258-285). But as indicated at the start of this article, the UPR is an evolving mechanism with 
potential for greater state engagement over time and there is some empirical evidence that indicates a more robust 
engagement from states across UPR I and II (McMahon and Johnson 2016: 9).  
IV. Conclusion 
The UPR mechanism shows the power of peer pressure and global culture in enforcing human rights law through 
state influence. Acculturation particularly favours the UPR mechanism because it is based on peer review and 
not configured to involve a selected group of insiders or experts, examining or reviewing those considered as 
outsiders or states. This helps to dispel the perception of ‘us’ vs ‘them’. According to Goodman and Jinks, the 
cognitive and social pressures generated by the acculturation micro process of identification is more effective 
when an International Governmental Organisation provides universal membership and subjects all member states 
to review Goodman and Jinks 2013: 102). Stavropoulou (2008: 9-15) examined the acculturation theory in the 
context of refugee protection. She finds that refugee protection regimes could explore the benefits of inclusive 
membership through the creation of additional fora building on acculturation techniques. The UPR mechanism is 
inclusive, cooperative and collaborative, and has in two cycles achieved 100 percent state cooperation rate. These 
cornerstone principles of the UPR – universality and cooperation, can be effective in harnessing the social and 
cognitive pressures associated with acculturation which can facilitate the social learning process of African states 
as they engage with the UPR process.   
However, as observed by Goodman and Jinks, acculturation can produce a ‘decoupling’ situation where public 
conformity with human rights norms is disconnected from local practice (Goodman and Jinks 2013: 140). This 
is akin to the problem of ‘ritualism’ identified by Charlesworth and Lacking in the context of the UPR 
(Charlesworth and Larking 2015). They define ‘ritualism’ as state ‘participation in the process of reports and 
meetings but an indifference to, or even reluctance about, increasing the protection of human rights’ (ibid: 16).  
However, it is plausible that over time acculturation may help narrow the UPR implementation gap through 
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effective NGO participation in the UPR process. This reinforces the significant role of NGOs underscored in the 
transnational legal process theory and the five-stage spiral model. 
Acculturation provides a more suitable theoretical framework to understand the potential impact of the UPR 
mechanism on the influence of state. The inclusive, cooperative and collaborative framework of the UPR process 
are important and effective conditions for acculturation. Acculturation is a process and through this process, 
continuous engagement with the UPR mechanism can over time transform the shallow human rights commitment 
of states into a deeper commitment. Charlesworth argues that human rights compliance strategies that focus on a 
learning culture rather than a culture of blame are useful in achieving improved human rights protection 
(Charlesworth 2010). According to Charlesworth (ibid: 14-15): 
The idea of continuous improvement, which emphasises incremental, constantly 
monitored step can be achieved by moving from a culture that administers blame to a 
culture that encourages learning. 
The UPR provides such a platform for acculturation that promotes cooperation and encourages continuously 
improvement of the human rights situation within states. Applying the theory of acculturation contributes to an 
understanding of the efficacy of human rights strategies based on cooperation. This cooperative mechanism can 
be beneficial in realising incremental progress in human rights. Notwithstanding, different human rights 
mechanisms may be more or less effective depending on the political system in the state in question, along with 
other contextual factors. 
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